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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

ENOCH HANKERSON,

:

Case No. 20020974-CA

:

APPELLANT IS INCARCERATED

v.

Defendant/Appellant.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The State presents three alternative grounds for affirming the trial court's denial
of Appellant Enoch Hankerson's motion to dismiss for failure to timely prosecute,
Appellee's Br. 16-20, 25-28, but these grounds should not be considered by this Court.
This is because none of these grounds is supported by the trial court's findings of fact.
And, under Utah Supreme Court cases such as State v. Topanotes and Bailey v. Bayles. a
trial court's ruling may not be affirmed on alternative grounds unless the grounds are
fully supported by the court's findings of fact. State v. Topanotes. 2003 UT 30, f9;
Bailev v.Bavles, 2002 UT 58,1f 19-20, 52 P.3d 1158.
However, even if the alternative grounds are reached, they do not support an
affirmance. The State's first alternative ground is that trial could have been scheduled on
July 31, 2002, but was not scheduled until August 14, 2002 because of the defense
counsel scheduling conflict. Appellee's Br. 16-17. However, neither the factual findings

nor the record as a whole reflect this. The factual findings merely note that, at a hearing
on July 2nd, trial was scheduled for August 14th and a pretrial conference for July 30th.1
Further, the transcript from July 2nd shows that the trial court had another trial already
scheduled for July 31 st , and could not offer that trial date. First Case 177 [2-2]. And so,
there is nothing to show that the defense counsel's scheduling conflicts caused a delay.
The State's second alternative ground argument is that the defendant's motion to
transfer two of his three cases to the same court for consolidation caused delay.
Appellee's Br. at 17-20. However, the transfers did not delay the case. They were
requested during the first scheduled roll calls of the two cases to be transferred, Second
Case 27; Third Case 17, and they were necessary to the consolidation of Mr. Hankerson's
three cases. There is nothing in the 120-day disposition statute or case law to show that
necessary appearances constitute a delay which must be reviewed for good cause.
Further, if the prosecutor did consider this a delay, he had an obligation to object to it.
State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, Tfl4, 34 P.3d 790. But he did not, and so there is no
basis for this argument.
The State's last alternative ground, which is that the prosecutor made a good faith
effort to have the case heard in a timely manner, Appellee's Br. 25-28, does not support

1

Third Case 186. Citations to the record in this brief are made the same way as in
Appellant's Opening Brief. That is, citations to case number 021200613FS will be referred to as
"First Case" plus the record number. Citations to case number 021200272FS will be referred to
as "Second Case" plus the record number. Citations to case number 021200271FS will be
referred to as "Third Case" plus the record number.
2

an affirmance of the trial court. This is because the crux of this appeal is that Mr.
Hankerson's trial was delayed because the prison records office, pursuant to an illegal
policy, failed to forward his original 120-day disposition request to the prosecutor and
court. Aplt Br. 10-28. Whether the prosecutor acted in good faith is beside the point
because it is the prison records office who was principally at fault.
In sum, the trial court erred in denying Mr. Hankerson's motion to dismiss this
case for failure to prosecute within 120 days. Further, the State's alternative grounds do
not justify an affirmance. So, this case should be reversed and dismissed with prejudice.

ARGUMENT
I. THE STATE'S "ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS" ARGUMENTS
SHOULD NOT BE REACHED BECAUSE THERE ARE NO
SUPPORTING FACTUAL FINDINGS
The crux of the State's argument is that the trial court's denial of Mr. Hankerson's
motion to dismiss is justified on three bases not considered by the trial court. First, the
State argues that the delay in prosecuting was caused by the defense counsel's scheduling
conflict at a July 2nd hearing. Appellee's Br. 16-17. Second, the State's argues that the
defendant's motion to transfer his cases to the same court caused delay. Id. at 17-20.
Finally, the State argues that prosecutor made a good faith effort to have the case heard
in a timely manner. Id. at 25-28.
However, all of these arguments fail. Indeed, these arguments should not even be

3

considered by this Court because they are not supported by the trial court'sfindingsof
fact. And, a trial court's decision may not be affirmed on alternative grounds unless it is
supported by the findings of fact. This is shown by the case law.
It is undisputed that, in some circumstances, an appellate court may affirm a trial
court's ruling on alternative grounds. This rule was articulated by the Utah Supreme
Court in the case of Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n. In that case, the Court
used the rule to affirm the trial court's decision that the plaintiff could not recover on a
realty contract:
The law is well settled that a trial court should be affirmed if on the record
made it can be. The general law is stated in 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error §
1464(1) as follows:" * * * The appellate court will affirm the judgment,
order, or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or
theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs
from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and
this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on
appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not
considered or passed on by the lower court. * * * "
Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n. 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (Utah 1969).
This doctrine comports with due process. Specifically, any alternative grounds
must be fully supported by uncontroverted evidence. As this Court explained in State v.
Montoya. a factual basis for alternative grounds may never be assumed:
Critical to affirmance is the requirement that the ground or theory be
"apparent on the record."... If, in any way, the ground or theory urged for
the first time on appeal is not apparent on the record, the principle of
affirming on any proper ground has no application. To hold otherwise
would invite the prevailing party to selectively focus on issues below, the
effect of which is holding back issues that the opposition had neither notice
4

of nor an opportunity to address. Because of this due process component,
"apparent on the record," in this context, means more than the mere
assumption or absence of evidence contrary to the "new" ground or theory.
The record must contain sufficient and uncontroverted evidence supporting
the ground or theory to place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice
that the prevailing party may rely thereon on appeal.
State v. Montova, 937 P.2d 145, 149-50 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added). In fact,
a strong factual basis has always been essential to the application of the alternative
grounds rule.2
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court issued two well-articulated opinions, State v.
Topanotes and Bailey v. Bayles, emphasizing that an alternative ground for affirmance
must not only be apparent on the record, but also supported by the trial court's factual
findings. State v. Topanotes. 2003 UT 30, Tf9; Bailevv. Bavles. 2002 UT 58, f20, 52
P.3d 1158. This is because, as the Utah Supreme Court stated in Bailey v. Bayles. it is
fundamental that an appellate court may not disregard the trial court's factual findings
and weigh the evidence to make its own findings of fact. Bailey. 2002 UT 58, TJ19. And
so, any alternative ground not completely supported by the trial court's findings of fact

2

See Dipomav. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ^[18, 29 P.3d 1225 ("because the alternate ground
for affirmance presented by [appellee/petitioner] is apparentfromthe record and was briefed and
argued by the parties on appeal, we choose to address it."); State v. Finlayson. 2000 UT 10, ^[31,
994 P.2d 1243 (where the court has a "complete factual record" it "may affirm a judgment of a
lower court if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record."); Limb, 461
P.2d at 293 n.2 ("a trial court should be affirmed if on the record made it can be"); State v. Wells,
928 P.2d 386, 390-92 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (addressing and rejecting an alternative Fourth
Amendment argument raised by the state for the "first time on appeal"), aff d State v. Wells, 939
P.2d 1204 (Utah 1997) (unanimously affirming court of appeals' analysis); State v. Chevre. 2000
UT App 6, fl2, 994 P.2d 1278 (appellate court may affirm where the legal ground raisedfirston
appeal was "apparent on the record").
5

should be rejected:
In the limited circumstances that an appellate court chooses to affirm on an
alternate ground, it may do so only where the alternate ground is apparent
on the record. When an alternate theory is apparent on the record, the court
of appeals must then determine whether the facts as found by the trial court
are sufficient to sustain the decision of the trial court on the alternate
ground. The court of appeals is limited to the findings of fact made by the
trial court and may not find new facts or reweigh the evidence in light of
the new legal theory or alternate ground.
Id. at f20 (emphasis added). As a practical matter, this means that an appellate court must
first determine whether the alternative ground is apparent on the record, and then look at
the findings of fact to determine whether the ground is factually supported. Topanotes ,
2003 UT 30,1J9.
In this case, none of the State's three alternative grounds for affirmance are
sustainable by the trial court's factual findings. The first alternative ground, which is that
the defense counsel had a scheduling conflict that delayed the trial, is not supported in
any degree by either the factual findings or even the record as a whole. The second
alternative ground, which is that the defendant's motion to transfer his cases to the same
court caused delay, is addressed in part by the factual findings, but not to a degree that
allows this Court to reach the issue. The third alternative ground, which is that the
prosecutor made a good faith effort to have the case heard in a timely manner, is not
addressed at all in the factual findings. Each of these alternative grounds will be
examined in order below.

6

A. Neither the Factual Findings Nor the Record Supports that the Defense
Counsel had a Scheduling Conflict Which Delayed the Trial
First, the State argues that the trial court properly denied Mr. Hankerson's motion
to dismiss because trial was set beyond the 120-day deadline due to the defense counsel's
scheduling conflicts. Appellee's Br. 16-17. The State argues that, at a hearing on July 2 nd,
the trial court suggested a trial date of September 13th, and the defense counsel responded
that trial needed to be set sooner. Id. at 16. Then the dates of July 31st or August 14th
were then suggested, but defense counsel was unavailable for the earlier July 31 st date.
Id at 16-17. Because of this, the State argues, the 120 days should have been tolled from
the July 31st date. Id at 17.
However, the trial court's factual findings do not support this. The only findings
relevant to the July 2nd hearing and subsequent court dates are as follows:
15
A preliminary hearing was held and the defendant was bound over
on all remaining charges to the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto for a scheduling
conference to be held on July 2, 2002.
16. Roger Blaylock of the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office
appeared at the scheduling conference on July 2,2002, and the Defendant
and his Attorney, Kimberly Clark, appeared and a trial date was set for
August 14, 2002, and a pretrial conference was set for July 30, 2002. The
jury trial and pretrial conference [were] to be held in the Salt Lake
Department before the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto due to the fact that the
Murray Department was to be closed effective July 31, 2002, as to criminal
matters.
First Case 152-53; Second Case 49-50; Third Case 186-87.
None of these findings indicate that a sooner trial date would have been set but for

7

a scheduling conflict of the defense counsel's. Indeed, the findings do not address this
point at all. They merely state that a pretrial conference was set for July 30th and that trial
was set for August 14th. First Case 152; Second Case 49; Third Case 186. There is
nothing that shows that the August 14 th date was set because of defense counsel's
scheduling conflict. See Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ^|9 (holding that any alternative ground
for affirmance must be supported by the trial court's findings of fact); Bailey, 2002 UT
58, f20 (same). Because of this, the issue should not be reached.
What is more, even if the record as a whole if reviewed, the State's position is not
supported. Indeed, the transcript from the July 2 nd hearing itself shows that, contrary to
the State's argument, the July 31 st trial date was not available for trial. First Case 177 [12]. This is because the trial court had another trial scheduled for that date which
happened to involve Kimberly Clark, Mr. Hankerson's defense counsel at that time. The
transcript shows the following exchange between the trial court and Ms. Clark:
MS. CLARK: We would like to set these matters for trial. I want the Court
to be aware [Mr. Hankerson] has filed a 120 day disposition on this matter
- on all three matters. My only difficulties are 1 have a trial in front of you
on the 31 st and 1st that's in custody.
THE COURT: Well, here's the dates that I have because there's a
conference I must attend on September 11 th and 12th which is trial - which
is a date. I have July 31 st , August the 14th.
MS. CLARK: And on the 31 st I already have an in custody case with you.
THE COURT: [inaudible].
MS. CLARK: That's an aggravated robbery with Mr. Petty. And that's
8

going to trial. So the Court [inaudible].
THE COURT: The 14 th of August then?
MS. CLARK: Great.
Id
This shows that the trial court had another trial scheduled on the 31 st and could not
offer that date. Besides that, the transcript actually supports that the defense counsel was
doing everything she could to avoid going beyond the 120-day deadline. The defense
counsel, who had no duty to make the court aware of the 120-day disposition or make
efforts to move the case forward,3 did both of those things. Id. She made every effort to
have the case tried in time, and agreed to the first date the court had available, which was
August 14th and not July 31st, as the court originally thought. Id. And so, there is no basis
in the transcript for the State's argument that an earlier trial date was missed because of
defense counsel's schedule.
Likewise, there is no merit to the State's complaint that the defense counsel had an
in-custody homicide trial the first week in August, but "made no offer of availability for
[trial for] an earlier date" than that. Appellee's Br. at 17. The trial court's first available
trial date before September was August 14 th. Id at 2. The court had no date available
before the first week in August, or even the first week in August, so the defense
counsel's schedule before August 14 th was inconsequential. Ld What is more, the defense
3

It is the prosecutor who bears the burden of moving the case forward under Utah Code
Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999). State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911, 915 (Utah 1998).
9

counsel stated at the beginning of the hearing that she would make room for trial at any
time with the only exceptions of the July 31st matter that she already had scheduled with
that court, and a homicide trial the following week. Id. at 1. All of this shows that the
defense counsel did not cause a scheduling problem.
In sum, the State's argument that the trial court should be affirmed on the
alternative ground that the defense counsel caused a scheduling conflict should not be
reached. This argument is not supported in the findings of fact or even in the transcript
cited by the State, and so there is no basis for review.

B. The Factual Findings do not Support that the Case Transfers Caused a
Delay Attributable to Mr, Hankerson
The State's second alternative ground for an affirmance is that Mr. Hankerson
caused a delay by requesting a transfer of two of his three cases so that the three cases
could be consolidated. Appellee's Br. 17-20. The State argues that, on April 3 rd, the
defense counsel requested a continuance to transfer his two Salt Lake cases to the Murray
court, where the third was pending, so that "counsel could more conveniently represent
defendant in all of them." Appellee's Br. 18. This continuance lasted until May 1st, the
State argues. Id at 19. So, according to the State, the eighteen days between April 9th,
when the prison received Mr. Hankerson's first 120-day disposition request, and May 1 st
should be tolled. IcL
But the trial court's factual findings do not support that this was a delay
10

attributable to Mr. Hankerson. Indeed, the findings list only relevant dates and basic
information about the transfer requests. Specifically, the findings show the following:
* The First Case was filed in the Murray Department of the 3 r d Judicial District
Court on March 7, 2002. Third Case 183.
* The Second Case was originally filed in the Salt Lake Department of the 3 r d
Judicial District Court on March 21,2002. IcL
* The Third Case was originally filed in the Salt Lake Department of the 3 r d
Judicial District Court on March 15, 2002. IdL
* Kimberly Clark of the Salt Lake Legal Defender's Office was appointed to
represent Mr. Hankerson in all three cases. IdL at 183-84.
* Mr. Hankerson made his initial appearance in the First Case, and roll call was
held April 3, 2002. IcL at 183. At that time, the First Case "was continued by the
Defendant and his Attorney, Kimberly Clark, until May 1, 2002, to allow the Salt Lake
Department criminal cases to be transferred to the Murray Department of the Third
District Court.1' Id at 184.
* Mr. Hankerson made initial appearances in the Second and Third Cases in
March, 2002, and roll call for both cases was set for April 9, 2002. I d . at 183-84.
* At the April 9th roll call, the Second and Third Cases were transferred to the
Murray Department. IdL at 184. Another roll call was set for these two cases for May 1 st ,
along with the First Case. IcL at 184.

11

* The prosecutor did not request the continuance of the First Case, or the transfer
of the Second and Third Cases. Id.
To be sure, these findings give some information about the transfer dates and
continuance and transfer requests. However, much of the information needed to
determine whether these transfers constituted good cause for a continuance is missing.
For example, the findings do not show whether the prosecutor objected to the motions
for a continuance and for transfers. They do not show whether the prosecutor mentioned
the possible filing of a request for 120-day disposition. They do not show the reason for
the transfers. And, they do not show how the May 1 st roll call date was scheduled and
whether any party or the court had scheduling conflicts with a sooner date.
Without this information, a conclusion about whether the transfers constituted a
good-cause delay cannot be reached by this Court. Cases such as State v. Heaton. State v.
Petersen, and State v. Coleman suggest that the prosecutor should object to any delays
and bring the possibility of a 120-day disposition request to the trial court's attention.
Heaton. 958 P.2d at 915; State v. Petersen. 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991); State v.
Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, Tfl4, 34 P.3d 790. Further, the trial court as well as the
prosecutor has an obligation to move a case forward; so in this case, if the court was not
available for roll call any sooner, there is no good-cause delay. See. Heaton. 958 P.2d at
915 (court's administrative matters do not justify trial delay). The bottom line is that the
lack of factual findings about the reason for the transfers or scheduling information

12

makes the matter unresolvable on the record. So, this issue should not be reached.
However, the State argues that the issue should be reached and cites to the roll call
transcript of the First Case, where the defense counsel made a few comments about the
transfer requests. Appellee's Br. 18-19. But this transcript merely shows that the defense
counsel asked for a continuance in the First Case to allow time for the Second and Third
Cases to be transferred so that they could be handled together.4 And her reasons for
doing this aren't clear. She mentions that it would be convenient to have the cases
together, but also gives another reason which was inaudible on the transcript. First Case
176 [1]. Significantly, the transcript shows that the prosecutor did not object to the
request for a continuance, or mention the possibility of a 120-day disposition request. Id.
at 1-2. If anything, this supports that there was no good-cause delay.
Also, nothing in the records of the Second and Third Cases is helpful to the
State's argument. The transcripts of both cases merely show that the cases were
transferred from Salt Lake to Murray on April 10, 2002. Second Case 25; Third Case 15.
Then, roll call for both was held May 1st. Second Case 29; Third Case 19. There is no
other information. And at any rate, reference to a transcript is not enough to support a

4

First Case 176 [1]. The continuance was requested at the roll call of the First Case,
which was in Murray on April 3, 2002. Id. at 27. The roll calls of the Second and Third Cases,
which were in Salt Lake, were held April 9,2002, and the transfer requests were made then.
Second Case 27; Third Case 17. The cases were transferred the next day. Second Case 25; Third
Case 15. Roll call on all the three cases was held in Murray on May 1st. First Case 32.
13

conclusion by this Court about whether there was a good-cause delay.5
All in all, the issue about whether the case transfers caused a delay cannot be
reached because the factual findings do not provide enough information to make the
determination. Further, it is inappropriate to refer to the transcripts or other parts of the
record because they do not give all of the information necessary to make factual findings.
So, this Court should not consider the State's argument that there was a good-cause delay
caused by the transfer requests in this case.

C. The Factual Findings do not Address Whether the Prosecutor Acted in
Good Faith
The State argues, as a third alternative ground for affirmance, that the prosecutor
made a good faith effort to have the case tried within the 120-day time period. Appellee's
Br. 25-28. The prosecutor initially knew only of the third disposition request, the State
argues, and he tried to have the case heard within that time frame. Appellee's Br. 26. So,
a dismissal of this case would be unfair. Id.
But the trial court's factual findings do not address this at all, other than to note
that, originally, only the third request was forwarded to the Salt Lake County District

5

See Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ^[9 ("not only must the alternative ground be apparent on
the record, it must also be sustainable by the factual findings of the trial court."); Bailey 2002
UT 58,1f20 ("When an alternate theory is apparent on the record, the court of appeals must then
determine whether the facts as found by the trial court are sufficient to sustain the decision of the
trial court on the alternate ground.")
14

Attorney's Office.6 Besides, this argument does not fully take into account the 120-day
disposition statute. Whether a prosecutor makes a good faith effort to try a case within
120 days is, of course, important in determining whether a case should be dismissed
under the 120-day disposition statute. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915-16. But it is not the only
relevant factor. A case may be dismissed for many other reasons. For example, it may be
dismissed because of court administrative errors,7 or because the prosecutor did learn of
the 120-day disposition notice in time to avoid delay. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^[14.
Indeed, the burden to try the case within 120 days is not, in practicality, the
prosecutor's alone. It is the State's responsibility. The defendant's holding facility,
sheriff or other law enforcement, and court share in the duty to bring a defendant to trial.5

6

Third Case 185. The findings also show that the 120-day disposition request was
properly made and the prosecutor had actual notice of the request:
The Defendant's request for disposition was sufficiently completed to put the
State of Utah on notice of pending charges and the Salt Lake District Attorney's
Office properly identified all pending cases against the defendant when it received
the disposition request of May 17,2002, and the Salt Lake District Attorney's
Office did in fact identify all pending charges in its jurisdiction after receiving the
Notice and Request for Disposition received May 17, 2002.
Id
7

Heaton,958P.2dat915.

8

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (2) & (3) (1999) ("(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial
officer, upon receipt of the demand described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the
demand to be forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the
appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall,
upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, provide the attorney with such information
concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. (3) After
written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the prosecuting attorney or the
15

The failure of any of these to do their part may result in a dismissal of a case.
However, the State asserts that a dismissal of this case is unfair and that
dismissing it would reward Mr. Hankerson for being deceptive and for manipulating the
system. The State says:
The State should not have to suffer the ultimate in sanctions - dismissal
with prejudice of all charges - where the prosecutor complied with his duty
under the statute to the best of his ability, and the only person who could
have corrected the prosecutor's misperception of the disposition period defendant - did not timely do so. Such a ruling would permit defendants to
manipulate the system to their own advantage and obtain a windfall benefit
from their deception.
Appellee's Br. 28.
But there is no substance to this. As already shown, even if a prosecutor does what
he can to comply with the statute, administrative errors or other events may cause the
dismissal of the case.9 And, whether this is fair is a matter for the legislature to decide.
By enacting the 120-day disposition statute, the legislature determined that a case should
be dismissed with prejudice if it is not heard within 120 days of a defendant's properlyexecuted and delivered request. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (1999). This is the plain

defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with the prisoner or his counsel
being present, may be granted any reasonable continuance.")
9

Mr. Hankerson does not concede that the prosecutor did everything he could in this case
to comply with the statute. See Aplt. Br. 25-27 (arguing that the prosecutor could have done
more to make the August 6th deadline in this case). However, even if it is assumed that he did,
this is not enough to justify the State's failure to bring Mr. Hankerson to trial within 120 days of
his original request for 120-day disposition.
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language of the 120-day disposition statute, and the plain language must be given
force.11 And so, the State's argument that dismissing this case would be unfair is not
legally supported.
Finally, the State's implication that Mr. Hankerson was being deceptive in this
case is unfounded. There is no indication that Mr. Hankerson, who is not legally trained,
attempted to cause confusion by sending three notices for 120-day disposition. Indeed, he
was simply following the prison records office's instructions to "resubmit [his 120-day
disposition notice] when you have the funds [to mail it] or have met the indigent policy."
First Case D. Ex. 2; Third Case 43-44.
Further, there is no indication that Mr. Hankerson's original attorney, Kimberly
Clark of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association, knew of the three notices and
deliberately withheld this information. After all, she handled only the roll call and
preliminary hearing before the case was reassigned. First Case 32, 44-45. Further, Mr.
Hankerson's substitute counsel, Robert Heineman, brought the original notice to the
attention of the court and prosecutor at his first court appearance after he was assigned to

10

Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (1999) ("If the courtfindsthat the failure of the
prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time required is not supported by good
cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was made or not, the court shall order the
matter dismissed with prejudice.")
11

Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist.. 2002 UT 130,1f2l, 63 P.3d 705; State v. Bluff. 2002
UT 66, U34, 52 P.3d 1210; State v. Laffertv. 2001 UT 19, fW, 20 P.3d 342.
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this case.12
In sum, there is no indication of deceptiveness or manipulation here. The crux of
this case is that the prison records office maintained an illegal policy for handling
prisoners' 120-day disposition requests,13 and this case should have been dismissed as a
result.

II. EVEN IF THE "ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS" ARGUMENTS ARE
REACHED. THEY FAIL ON THE MERITS
Procedurally, even when a trial court's factual findings give enough information
for an alternative grounds review, the trial court's reasoning should be reviewed first.
Then, if this reasoning fails, the alternative grounds arguments may be reviewed.14 But in
this case, neither the trial court's reasoning nor the alternative grounds arguments have
merit. And so, this case should be reversed as a matter of law.
The following subsection shows why the State's argument that the trial court's
12

First Case 54-55; 177 [3-1]. Mr. Heineman appeared in this case on July 11, 2002. Id.
at 51. The next scheduled court appearance was a pretrial conference on July 30th, and Mr.
Heineman brought the original notice to the court's and prosecutor's attention at that time. Id. at
177 [3-1].
13

See Aplt. Br. 10-16,18-25 (demonstrating that the prison records office violated the
120-day disposition statute by not forwarding properly-executed and delivered 120-day
disposition requests to the prosecutor an court).
14

See Dipoma, 2001 UT 61,1fl7 (addressing the alternative grounds arguments after
rejecting the appellant's principle argument); In re J.D.M., 808 P.2d 1122, 1125 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) ("Because we can affirm the juvenile court's finding that grounds exist for terminating
appellant's parental rights based on abandonment, it is unnecessary to address the alternative
ground of parental unfitness.1')
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reasoning is sound is incorrect. The subsequent subsection demonstrates that the State's
alternative grounds arguments, if reached, do not support an affirmance.

A. The State Makes no Substantial Argument in Support of the Trial
Court's Grounds for its Denial of the Motion to Dismiss
With regard to the trial court's rulings, the State agrees with Mr. Hankerson that
the court correctly found that the commencement date for the 120-day period was April
9, 2002, when the original 120-day disposition request was received by the prison
records office. Appellee's Br. 20-21. However, unlike Mr. Hankerson, the State supports
the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. But the State advances only one
substantial argument in favor of the trial court's reasoning.15 That is, that the court was
correct in denying the motion based on its conclusion that the 120-day period tolled from
July 30, 2002 to August 9, 2002. Id. at 21. The State argues that this was correct because
July 30th was the date that Mr. Hankerson raised the issue of the 120-day disposition, and
August 9th was the day that the motion was heard. I&_ at 22-23.
But the State itself acknowledges that the motion did not actually delay the trial.
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Besides the substantial argument, the State does mention the trial court's ruling that Mr.
Hankerson caused confusion by sending the prison records office three different requests for 120day disposition. But the State does not seriously support this ruling. Appellee's Br. 24-25.
Instead, the State merely summarizes Mr. Hankerson's argument that the confusion was actually
created by the prison records office's failure to send thefirsttwo notices. Id. at 25. Then the State
describes this arguments as "interesting" and says that "this Court need not reach defendant's
argument." Id.
19

Id. at 23. The trial date was already set before the motion was made and was not
rescheduled for the motion.16 As Mr. Hankerson argued in the opening brief, the motion
did not disarrange the trial date in any way, and so there is no basis for tolling the period
between the time the defense counsel stated his intent to file the motion and the date of
the motion hearing. Aplt. Br. 17-18.
The State argues, nevertheless, that the motion caused confusion about the 120day period and so tolling is appropriate. Id. at 23-24. However, there is no legal or
practical basis for this argument. As just stated, there is no practical basis because the
trial was not delayed because of the motion. Additionally, there is no legal basis in the
120-day disposition statute or case law. Of course, there is case law holding that a delay
caused by a defendant's motion may toll the 120 days,17 but these cases do not support
that Mr. Hankerson's Motion to Dismiss tolled the period here. This is because, in those
cases, the motions actually did cause trial delays.
For instance, in State v. Heaton. cited by the State in support of its position, trial
had to be rescheduled because the defendant requested a preliminary hearing, which he
had initially waived. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916. The requested preliminary hearing caused
a delay from September 9th, when trial was originally scheduled, to September 27 th, when

16

The trial date was scheduled on July 2, 2002 for August 14th. First Case 49-50; Second
Case 37-38; Third Case 29-30. This date was never changed.
17

In support of its position, the State cites to State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911, 916 Utah
1998); State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325, 1329-30 (Utah 1986); and State v. Peterson. 2002 UT
App. 53,1f8, 42 P.3d 1258.
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the defendant was arraigned after being bound over. Id_ This delay tolled the 120 days,
the Utah Supreme Court ruled. Id.
In State v. Banner, also cited by the State, the defendant caused three different
postponements of trial. Trial was originally scheduled for July 12 th, but was postponed to
September 5th because of the defendant's need to change counsel. Banner, 717 P.2d at
1329. Then, the September 5 th trial was postponed to November 13th on the defendant's
motion. Id Finally, the November 13 th trial was postponed to December 4 th in order for
the court to hear the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial and motion to
exclude evidence of his prior convictions. Id. These were actual delays that were caused
solely by the defendant, the Utah Supreme Court ruled, and so they could not be counted
in calculating whether the defendant's speedy trial right was violated. Id. at 1329-30.
In State v. Coleman, which was not cited by the State but is on point, the
defendant filed a motion to suppress and a motion to dismiss, and these motions were
heard approximately six weeks later. State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^ 10-11, 34
P.3d 790. During this period, trial could not be scheduled. Id. This Court found that this
tolled the 120 days from the time that the first motion was filed until the motions were
heard and a ruling issued. Id. at ^[11.
In State v. Petersen, cited by the State, the defendant's motion to suppress caused
the court to delay the trial schedule so that a motion schedule could be set. Petersen, 2002
UT App 53,1J7-8. This motion schedule was established to accommodate the defense
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counsel's schedule and need for time. Id. at ^[7. In fact, a trial schedule could not even be
set until the motion was resolved. Id. In these circumstances, this Court ruled that the
motion caused a tolling of the 120 days. Id. at 1J8.
Finally, other cases not cited by the State also show that the 120 days may be
tolled only if there is an actual time delay. In State v. Pathammavong. this Court ruled
that the 120 days was tolled as a result of delays caused by the defendant's three requests
for continuances, "two for new counsel to prepare for hearings and the third to interview
a newly discovered witness." State v. Pathammavong. 860 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993). In State v. Maestas, the 120 days was tolled because the "[djefendant filed
several continuances, changed counsel twice, and agreed to postpone trial until after the
disposition of his pretrial motions." State v. Maestas. 815 P.2d 1319,1321 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).
All of this shows that the 120 days is tolled only if an actual delay occurs.
Contrary to the State's argument, the 120 days cannot be tolled simply because parties
were uncertain how Mr. Hankerson's motion, which did not delay trial, would be ruled
upon. While it is true that the disposition of the motion may have affected whether the
trial was necessary, it did not actually delay trial. And so, there is no basis to toll the 120
days because of this motion.

22

B. The " Alternative Grounds" Arguments are Contradicted by the 120-day
Disposition Statute and the Case Law
The State's three alternative grounds arguments are not soundly based in the law.
The State's first ground is that a July 31 st trial date could have been set but for the
defense counsel's scheduling conflict. Appellee's Br. 16-17. However, as already shown,
July 31st was not actually available because the trial court already had a trial scheduled on
that date. First Case 177 [2-1 through 2]. Further, the transcript of the scheduling hearing
shows that the defense counsel did everything possible to schedule a timely trial. She
informed the court of the 120-day notice, Id. at 2-1, objected to a September trial date as
being too late, Id, agreed to the August 14th date that the court had available, Id, at 2-2,
and answered the court's legal questions about the 120-day disposition statute. Id_ at 2-3.
In general, she insisted that trial be scheduled as soon as possible. Id. at 2-1 through 4.
The prosecutor did none of this even though it is the prosecutor who has the legal burden
of moving the case forward. See. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915 (the duty of complying with the
120-day statute is on the prosecutor). And so, there is no factual legal basis for the State's
alternative grounds argument that the defense counsel caused a delay in this case.
The State's second alternative ground is equally meritless. This is that the
defendant's motion to transfer his cases to the same court caused delay. Appellee's Br. at
17-20. However, as this Court already decided in State v. Coleman. the prosecutor may
not passively stand by and accept delays. Coleman. 2001 UT App. 281, ^14. This is
particularly true at the beginning of the case, when the prosecutor knows that a 120-day
23

disposition request may be forthcoming. Id.
Further, in this case, the transfer requests came almost immediately. In fact, they
came soon after the first appearances in the three cases,18 and just a few days before the
prison records office received Mr. Hankerson's first request for 120-day disposition on
April 9, 2002. First Case D. Ex. 2. This was soon enough in the proceedings that the
prosecutor should have been cognizant of the possibility of the 120-day disposition, and
avoided delays.
What is more, the transfers do not even constitute a delay. The transfers were
necessary for the consolidation of the cases, which appears to have been contemplated,
and there is nothing to show that necessary proceedings constitute delays under the 120day disposition statute.19 In fact, such proceedings are precisely what should be taken
into account as the parties schedule the pretrial and trial appearances, and work to keep
these appearances within 120 days. And so, the State's second alternative ground for
affirmance fails.
Finally, the last alternative ground, which is that prosecutor made a good faith
effort to have the case heard in a timely manner, does not justify an affirmance. This is

18

Defense Counsel put in an appearance in the First Case on March 19, 2002, First Case
19, the Second Case on April 1st, Second Case 21, and the Third Case on April 1st, Third Case 11.
The case transfers were requested on April 3rd. First Case 27-28.
19

See Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, ^14 (necessary appearances such as preliminary
hearing must fit into 120 days); Heatoa 958 P.2d at 915 (implying that prosecutor's duty to try
within 120 days includes the necessary appearances).
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because, as already shown in the First Section above, the prosecutor's good faith alone
does not prevent a dismissal under the 120-day disposition statute. The State's duty to
prosecute includes not only the prosecutor, but the holding facility records officers and
agents, sheriff or other law enforcement, and court system. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1
(1)(2) & (4) (1999). In this case, the prison records office applied an illegal policy of not
forwarding properly-executed and delivered notices for 120-day disposition. And so, this
case should have been dismissed.
In sum, neither the trial court's reasoning nor the State's alternative grounds
justifies an affirmance. The State failed to bring Mr. Hankerson to trial within 120 days
after his original request for 120-day disposition, and no good cause supported the delay.
And so, this case should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
In light of the above, Mr. Hankerson respectfully requests that this Court reverse
his conviction and dismiss the charges with prejudice.
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